Introduction - Exploring Foundations: Languages of Disability, Identity, and Culture by Mitchell, David T. & Snyder, Sharon L.
Current Research 
Introduction 
Exploring Foundations: Languages of Disability, Identity, and Culture 
David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder 
Northern Michigan University 
What is the difference between a scholar who writes on The Gospel 
According to Mark and a disability studies scholar who writes on the same topic? 
What happens when the latter crosses paths with a "deaf and dumb paralytic" and 
"demonaics"? What about the "unclean spirits" who lurk in the shadows? Our 
generic scholar, we would imagine, unflaggingly records their presence and focuses 
upon the nondisabled main actor(s ). The disability studies scholar pauses, shudders, 
seeks out the human subjects erased beneath these labels, and then invariably 
recognizes her own potential inclusion amongst them. (As Lois Bragg does in her 
essay in this volume.) Why does this difference in approach matter? And how 
does this scholarly activity differ from our own daily refusals and recastings, if we 
are disabled ourselves, of the labels that are tossed in our direction. Our disability 
studies scholar may take refuge in the opportunity for historical distance which 
allows her to scrutinize texts and events of past periods with a cold, analytical eye. 
This distance often proves unavailable to her on a day-to-day basis. She also ventures 
an approach to the meanings of these semi-fictional, quasi-historical figures. Such 
figures are some of the few textual remnants that allow her to reconstruct the attitudes 
and beliefs of a prior culture toward disability. In turn, our disability studies scholar 
notices more and more the prevalence of these side actors - these cripples, misfits, 
and fools - in the pages of Time's texts. 
Of course the plotline of this gospel story has been reread and rewritten for 
centuries by readers and writers before her. Who among them has stopped to notice 
these "demonaics"? For what purpose? Have writers from other epochs forged an 
approach or a distance to disabled figures? For instance, the German philosopher 
Friedrich Nietzsche restages a similar biblical encounter between a philosophical 
Christ-figure and his crippled hordes seeking a cure in Thus Spake Zarathustra. In 
this restaging does he then also critique or merely reiterate the metaphysical plight 
of the original? What does this say about the coherence or variability of attitudes 
toward the disabled in other historical moments? 
Our disability studies scholar further notes that cripples and grotesques 
come walking through Zarathustra's forest at regular intervals and yet no other 
historian or philosopher has ever connected up people with disabilities to Nietzsche's 
project (though plenty have noted the Nazi use ofNietzsche's writings as justification 
241 
for their extermination programs). She begins to analyze their disruptive presence, 
their general exclusion from other philosophical treatises, and Nietzsche's use of 
them as discomforting presences within his own philosophical system. This 
interpretive activity requires an analysis ofdisability language, roles, and conventions 
in his philosophical allegories. Much of her approach depends upon the markings 
and erasures effected by labels, terms, and linguistic propositions that lead to a 
sense of the varying constructions of disability over time. "History" becomes an 
archive of texts that articulates numerous social systems which produced attitudes 
and meanings for various kinds of different and impaired bodies. 
In the application of an approach such as the one outlined above, the 
disability studies scholar in the humanities begins to allow us a glimpse of historical 
negotiations and attitudes toward disability. A disability studies humanities approach 
helps to identify a previously absent or unarticulated tradition of disability. To 
resurrect and reconstruct this tradition, disability studies scholars read between the 
lines and behind the potent sign systems used to designate deviance and difference. 
Like the "resistant readers" of feminism or racial criticism, we seek out disability 
from a perspective (constituted in the act of resistance itself) - a disabled perspective. 
This perspective neither simply accepts these presentations as truthful nor overlooks 
their significance for understanding disabled perspe'ctives in history. In this, 
humanities disability scholars are acquiring a sense of the constitutive role played 
by disabled peoples in the emergence of social and'semantic systems. 
Or inversely, we see the dependencies of representational systems upon 
them. What does it mean that sixty of the earliest preserved cuneiform tablets from 
2000 B.C. in ancient Mesopotamia identify more than 125 symbolic connotations 
for birth "anomalies"? Such an artifact points to the key precept that disabled 
people play a foundational role in the definition and evolution of cultures. Does 
ability exist without disability? Normalcy without physical deviance? Is there a 
heroic story of compensation without the reiteration of disabled limitations? Can 
human societies recognize immorality or evil without reference to biological 
"aberrancy"? 
Disability studies in the humanities has been critiqued for a tendency to 
surf amidst a sea of metaphors rather than stand on the firm ground of policy and 
legislative action. However, the identification of variable representational systems 
for approaching disability in history demonstrates in and of itself that disability 
operates as a socially constructed category. The more varied and variable the 
representation, the more fervent and exemplary disability studies scholars can make 
our points about the complexity and persistence of this social construction. 
From this same awareness, the scholars included in this volume interpret 
the "signs" that lead to social categories of stigma, segregation, and genocide. For 
instance, Will Sayers identifies how the use of physical descriptors such as 
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"crooked", "biased", or "wry necked" could exclude certain individuals from 
ascending to the kingship in early Irish narrative. In mapping a linguistic history of 
medicalized insanity and cognitive disability, Licia Carlson and Patrick McDonough 
invoke terms such as "moral imbecile", "mental illness", "idiots", and "madmen", 
to arrive at an understanding of the varied attempts to define the slippery definition 
of a "non-normative intellect". Cindy LaCom argues that physical differences came 
to be seen as increasingly "deviant" or "alien" during the ascendancy of a medical 
model in the nineteenth century that sought to regulate and normalize bodily 
variation. In order to interrogate ideals of oratory perfection, Brenda Brueggemann 
and James Fredal demonstrate the dependencies of a tradition of Rhetoric upon 
constructing an "other" of "impaired" performance. The point of attending to these 
conventions of genres, disabled character types, story modes, metaphors, and 
formulas, is to offer a previously unarticulated breadth to our comprehension of the 
history of disability. 
Sometimes, a focus upon the cross-referencing of texts has resulted in a 
suspicion that humanities scholarship neglects the."real" subject of disability. Even 
as the study of linguistic figures, tropes, and terms serves as a passageway back 
into the mindset and beliefs of other eras and cultures, it also gestures forward to 
the origins of current cultural attitudes and terminologies. Hence our efforts to 
identify the many permutations in the definition and role of disability in history 
should also enable us to chase down the multiple inflections in our own moment -
both the ascription of derogatory terms to us and our resistance, accommodation, , 
and self-inflection of them. In a basic sense (and as the disability movement's 
recent "fix-it" solutions to "diagnostic" labels shows us) the insult that different 
terms conjure up continues to foster the steady industry of our personal rejection 
and social revision. For example, we now prefer "delayed" over "retarded" - which 
was itself once intended to erase the inept "idiot" or the racist "mongolism". One 
can already imagine that eventually "delayed" will prove insufficient as the term is 
reappropriated and applied to ourselves in medicine, rehabilitation, and education. 
In this seeking out of the directions of our own (linguistic) "progress", in refusing 
"cripple" as corrupt or embracing "cripple" as pointedly sensationalist and archaic, 
we make apparent our own awareness of the insufficiencies oflanguage to adequately 
describe our experience. 
Humanities scholars tend to foreground a discussion of terminology as an 
open gesture toward understanding the value-laden meaning of vocabulary rather 
than simply electing to adopt the current "progressive" vernacular of the day. The 
majority of essays in this issue openly wrestle with their reasons for choosing one 
kind ofterm/category over another. Since language and story-telling are the principle 
means by which we filter and interpret our experience, one must think about and 
through the words and plotlines that different historical eras and cultures used to 
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define people with disabilities and those believed to represent various "aberrancies" 
or "conditions." This history of labels and epithets steeps, the disability studies 
researcher in a quagmire of dehumanizing references, and one often finds it tempting 
to lump everything together as evidence of the stigmatizing attitudes that have 
perpetually followed the disabled. Yet, as the essays in this issue demonstrate, 
there are substantial differences between vocabularies and meanings that must be 
teased out. 
A squaring off of different representational devices in varying historical 
periods can yield important distinctions in the cultural treatment of disability. For 
instance, the medieval designation of cripples as "demoniacs" demonstrates that 
physical and cognitive differences were treated as signs of divine punishment and 
metaphysical disruption. Those designated as "demoniacs" represented a powerful 
symbolic grouping signifying an intimacy with a secret knowledge of the celestial 
or as harbingers of foreboding cultural doom. These more symbolic and mythic 
meanings eventually gave way to other modes of representation such as an 
increasingly medicalized notion of pathology and deviance derived from statistically 
determined ideals of physical/cognitive norms. The evolution of later terminology 
such as the nineteenth-century term "invalid" suggests an emphasis upon bodily 
dysfunction and organic breakdown. Yet, while one ideologically coded system of 
terms gives way to other often equally denigrating ones, they continue to inform 
and inflect the other. The demoniacs of one era metamorphose into the monstrosity 
of another era which, in tum, evolves into the teratology of another; yet the 
voyeuristic fascination and cultural fetishization of a previous time continues to be 
practiced under a new set of rules, terms, and beliefs. Attending to such differences 
in the social construction of disability precludes many of the essayists in this volume 
from pursuing linguistic prescriptions as an antidote to the multiple historical 
valences of language. 
All of these examples demonstrate that the historical language used to define, 
segregate, and confine people with disabilities is a rich, but fraught area for research 
and interpretation. An encounter with this vast array of historical synonyms for 
physical and cognitive deviancy evidences that while we seek a less dehumanizing, 
politicized vocabulary to reference disability, such a project proves difficult. Even 
the widely accepted term of "disability" denotes a form of euphemistic window 
dressing that can not successfully exorcise the "barbarism" of previous terminology 
and attitudes from which we seek social redress and compensation. The battle over 
self-naming hits at the heart oflinguistic struggles themselves. Yet, as Mark Jeffries 
argues in his discussion of the relationship of linguistic signs to the goals of political 
reform: "rather than claiming or disclaiming any set of stigmata (or stigmatizing 
terminology), a successful poetics of disability would operate from a relentless 
skepticism of the motives and the truth-value of any sign (marks, names, jargon) .. 
244 
. [S]igns have no more an essential, autonomous existence than the categories they 
represent, and no sign can indelibly mark or irretrievably erase a meaning." This 
"relentless skepticism" provides disability studies with a more dynamic 
understanding of the politicized notion of language, and helps to develop a less 
naive historical recognition that all terms become contaminated with the very ideas 
they seek to obliterate or refuse. 
The need to develop a more protean sense oflanguage surfaces as disability 
studies methodologies become increasingly prominent in academic discourse. We 
see numerous examples of critics and educators who refuse to include disability 
under current work in identity and cultural studies. These arguments seize upon 
the "biological evidence" or bodily remainder of disability in order to shore up 
disabled people's difference from that of other socially disenfranchised 
constituencies. In this refusal, medicine is still assumed to offer up a pure diagnostic 
arena as opposed to a social one. Take this excerpt from the editor of the academic 
journal, Philosophy & Literature, in the middle of a diatribe against the politically 
correct policing of university press bias handbooks: 
The idea of normality (e.g., of white blood cell count, body proportion, 
breathing rate, bone fragility, rectal temperature, etc.) is fundamental to 
the theory and practice of medicine; it is not a set of prejudices but is 
achieved by the study of pathologies of disease and health. The same can 
be said ofcontrasting terms such as abnormal, subnormal, or above normal . 
. . you cannot parlay the commonness of some medical pathology into its 
normality, particularly if it is a condition people would normally be 
desperate to avoid or cure. "Black is beautiful" meant "black is normal," 
"we like being black," and even in an extended sense," "we choose to be 
black." This liberationist rhetoric is not transferable to the realm of 
blindness, wheelchairs, polio, and cretinism. People bravely make the best 
of these conditions, but they cannot claim to choose them. (Dutton 560, 
his emphasis) 
This argument exposes more than evidence of the persistence of political 
bigotry in the ivory tower of academic enlightenment. According to this ideology, 
while marginal identities such as race, gender, and sexuality can be resignified into 
powerful points of cultural identification, no amount oflinguistic triage can put the 
disabled body back together again. The recourse to medical terminology as "facts" 
- blood cell counts, body proportions, breathing rates, bone fragility, etc. - dredges 
up what the editor sees as the repressed downside or dark underbelly of disability. 
While anyone who has "done time" on the examination tables ofmedical institutions 
and as an object of medical "diagnosis" knows, "a set of prejudices" often proves 
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to be exactly what is on display. One could literally invert the above comment by 
saying that, the commonness ofmedical ideologies ofnormality are always parlayed 
into numerous justifications for the diagnosis ofpathologies. 
Contrary to the editor's belief, "abnormal, subnormal, and above normal" 
result from qualitative and subjective judgments (as opposed to objective statistics) 
that seek to use professional authority to, in Lennard Davis' words, "enforce 
normalcy." 
There is a good deal of historical contingency to arguments about the 
celebratory and chosen identity of Blackness, femininity, or any other cultural 
identification with a marginalized group. The capacity to embrace an historically 
denigrated position takes a history of effort to effect, and one never absolutely 
arrives at the desired objective. Derogatory epithets such as "nigger", "feminized", 
or "queer" still surface and, because oflanguage's slippery qualities, metamorphose 
into differently dehumanizing reference systems that invoke associations ofparticular 
biologies with welfare, criminality, unproductivity, and inferior intelligence. While 
it is difficult for the above cited commentator to imagine anyone choosing disability, 
our efforts to make disability a social category of identification rather than a "flawed 
condition" provides the opportunity of a choice. While one cannot always choose 
to extricate oneself from a medicalized notion of abnormalcy projected from the 
outside, the "disability" rubric provides an opportunity to upend social expectations. 
The choice of such a self-designation flirts with the scandalous political potential 
of embracing the very identity that critics believe to be repugnant and untenable. 
Further evidence of this stance is offered by the editor of the above quoted 
passage who goes on to reprove the gerrymandering tendencies of linguistic reform 
movements by explaining that, "sooner or later the schoolyard finds out, and retard 
becomes the coinage of abuse. Everyone ought to deplore the abuse, but it is a 
delusion to suppose that we alter medical facts by dispensing new names, for it is 
the' medical condition that is the problem, not the words that describe it" (Dutton 
559, his italics). Rather than deny that one embodies a socially despised biology, 
the objective ofdisability studies and the disability rights movement is to demonstrate 
that power derides some biologies in order to produce an environment of privilege 
for other bodily types. Since there is no choice to the inherent mutability ofbiology 
in the cases of race, gender, or disability (and sometimes it is argued sexuality), we 
set our disciplinary sites on the contexts within which that biology is derided and 
objectified. The "law of the playground" may persist but do our philosophers/ 
publishers/teachers have to participate in its denigrating and infantile logics? 
Yet, in many ways we have not sufficiently attended to the wild card of 
biology that operates as the point of our ostracization in the current political debate. 
As Paul Longmore once stated to me during a phone conversation about the 
weaknesses of our current politics, people with disabilities cannot afford to overlook 
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or deny the vulnerability and "real" limitations of their bodies. Is it necessary to 
refuse an acknowledgment of biological fragility or incapacity in order to establish 
an effective political movement? Can one not recognize the often very real 
limitations of the bodies that we inherit or acquire without having to give up on 
revising the politicized reception of the disabled body? The question that disability 
studies scholars must take up now is whether or not it is possible to acknowledge a 
physically/cognitively limited body that is not automatically viewed as hopeless, 
unproductive, or benightedly tragic in the social sphere. This will become one of 
the significant ways in which disability studies will not only shift our ideas of 
physical and cognitive difference, but also radically revise the neglect of the body 
in other disciplines and areas of inquiry. 
An adequate address of this question is complicated and will take years of 
effort, but the essays in this volume begin to make some important inroads toward 
formulating some possible approaches. For instance, Georgina Kleege explains 
that her blindness has spurred her own necessity to develop an unusual apparatus of 
tape recorded papers in her composition and creative writing classes. Such an 
adaptation has resulted in perhaps an even more effective pedagogical strategy for 
providing students with the opportunity to "hear" their writing before handing it in. 
Rosemarie Thomson addresses the innovations of theories in body criticism in order 
tb point out that even the most denigrated bodily forms provide interpretive 
alternatives to "deviance, lack, and inferiority." Susan Crutchfield points out that 
Hollywood's tendency to individualize the experience of disability can provide a 
useful template for analyzing the general public's reception of disability in the 
everyday world. In his essay on disability autobiography, G. Thomas Couser argues 
that writing one's own experience allows the control of self-definition and authority 
over the terms of the disabled body's presentation and reception. Ironically, it may 
be work on the admittedly more "textual" objects addressed in humanities scholarship 
that allows us to begin reintroducing a more material notion of the body back into 
disability studies methodologies, praxis, and politics. We are honored to present 
the essays which follow as examples of some of the best new thinking in disability 
studies. 
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